PROFESSIONAL COMPENSATION IN BANKRUPTCY:
USING CONTRACT LAW PRINCIPLES TO INTERPRET
AMBIGUOUS RETENTION ORDERS
CALEB J. BARTEL*
“[T]here are two tragedies in life. One is to lose your heart‟s desire. The other is to
gain it.”1
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1978, Congress‟ heart desired higher professional fees for services
rendered in bankruptcy.2 Low and often arbitrary compensation was causing
specialists to leave bankruptcy for more lucrative fields, thereby hurting debtors and
creditors in the process.3 As a result, Congress reformed the Bankruptcy Code and
enacted 11 U.S.C. § 3284 and 11 U.S.C. § 330.5
Sections 328 and 330 each created a different approach to professional fees.
The first approach allows a professional, hired by the trustee or a committee, to
request an employment retention order under § 328(a) that fixes the terms and
conditions of compensation.6 The bankruptcy court has the sole discretion to
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See Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. (92 Stat. 2549) 5787,
6286.
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11 U.S.C. § 328 (2007).
11 U.S.C. § 330(a) (2007).

11 U.S.C. § 328(a); Robert J. Landry, III & James R. Higdon, A Primer on 11 U.S.C. 328(A) and Its
Use in Alternative Billing Methods in Bankruptcy, 50 MERCER L. REV. 537, 541 (1999). However, the judge
may award compensation different from the fixed terms and conditions “if such terms and conditions
prove to be improvident in light of developments not capable of being anticipated at the time of the
fixing of such terms and conditions.” 11 U.S.C. § 328(a).
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approve a retention order and a fee arrangement under § 328.7 The second approach
permits a professional to request a retention order and reserve compensation issues
until the end of employment.8 At that time, the court awards “reasonable
compensation” under § 330(a).9
Each approach to professional fees provides distinct advantages. Section 328
rewards entrepreneurship, compensates for the professional‟s opportunity costs,
allows the professional to manage risk, and reduces transaction costs. In contrast, §
330 reduces the bankruptcy court‟s information costs, reduces collusion among the
trustee and the professional, and prevents strategic withholding by creditors.
Bankruptcy courts attempt to gain the advantages of both approaches by writing
ambiguous retention orders. These orders purport to approve the professional‟s
compensation under § 328 but reserve the court‟s ability to make a § 330
reasonableness evaluation if the compensation appears excessive.10 However,
ambiguous retention orders blend the two approaches and strip § 328 of the
certainty it is meant to guarantee for professionals.11 As a result, professional fee
awards are once again mired in arbitrariness. Reviewing courts add to the
uncertainty by interpreting ambiguous retention orders with conflicting default
rules.12
Academic scholarship on professional fees in bankruptcy extends from
arguments that high compensation signals the need for a “serious reform” of the
Compare 11 U.S.C. § 328(a) (requiring court approval of a retention order and fee arrangement and
giving the court the ability to later adjust the amount of compensation for improvident circumstances)
with 11 U.S.C. § 330(a) (allowing the court to award “reasonable compensation” for actual services
rendered).
7

8

11 U.S.C. § 330(a); Landry & Higdon, supra note 6, at 541.

9

11 U.S.C. § 330(a); Landry & Higdon, supra note 6, at 541.

See, e.g., In re Vern D. Blanchard, No. 96-12037-H7 1, 10-11 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. Dec. 19, 2005),
www.casb.uscourts.gov/pdf/96_12037m.pdf.
10

11

See id. (stating that ambiguous retention orders are subject to review under § 330).

Compare Circle K Corp. v. Houlihan, Lokey, Howard & Zukin, Inc. (In re Circle K Corp.), 279 F. 3d
669, 672, 674 (9th Cir. 2001) (amended Jan. 30, 2002) (holding that review under § 330 was
appropriate when the retention order did not mention § 328 and included language stating that the
retainer agreement was subject to review by the court) with Peele v. Cunningham (In re Tex. Sec., Inc.),
218 F.3d 443, 445 (5th Cir. 2000) (holding that review under § 330 is not appropriate when a court
has approved the terms of an employment agreement).
12
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entire Code13 to an exposition on the intricacies of § 328.14 Furthermore, at least one
article highlights the negative effects of some bankruptcy courts‟ continued
insistence on awarding below market compensation and suggests this to be a
violation of due process.15 However, no scholarship has addressed the problem that
reviewing courts face in interpreting ambiguous retention orders.
To this effect, I propose a solution which draws upon the interpretation
principles and default rules of contract law. Reviewing courts should first apply the
maxim contra proferentem—ambiguity will be read against the drafter—to read
ambiguous orders in favor of § 328. If, however, the specific terms or rate of
compensation remain uncertain after this maxim is applied, then reviewing courts
should fill the gap with § 330. This proposal creates an incentive for less ambiguous
retention orders and enhances overall efficiency.
Only bankruptcy professionals consider personal compensation the goal of
bankruptcy.16 However, compensation is what makes bankruptcy work.17 An
increase in the uncertainty regarding professional fees is a signal that Congress‟
desires are sinking and both creditors and debtors will be left struggling in the water.
Therefore, this problem invites further examination.
The body of this Article proceeds in four main sections. Part II reviews the
Congressional history of the 1978 bankruptcy reform and the mechanisms of the
current §§ 328 and 330. Part III examines the conflicting precedents of the Ninth
and Fifth Circuits and briefly points out the problems associated with the rules
adopted in each circuit. Part IV compares the advantages of § 328 with the
advantages of § 330 and examines why bankruptcy courts draft ambiguous retention
orders. Furthermore, Part IV provides an example from a recent case and explains
why ambiguous retention orders are eroding Congress‟ goal of attracting qualified
professionals to the bankruptcy arena. Part V summarizes contract law principles for

Cynthia A. Baker, Other People’s Money: The Problem of Professional Fees in Bankruptcy, 38 ARIZ. L. REV.
35, 36-37 (1996).
13
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See Landry & Higdon, supra note 6.

Ralph C. McCullough, II, Attorneys’ Fees in Bankruptcy: Toward Further Reform, 95 COM. L. J. 133, 16268 (1990).
15
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Baker, supra note 13, at 38.
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interpreting ambiguous contracts and applies these principles to propose a
mechanism to aid reviewing courts in interpreting ambiguous retention orders.
II. CONGRESSIONAL HISTORY
In 1978, Congress enacted a bankruptcy reform act to modernize the
Bankruptcy Code.18 The guiding principle of compensation under the old
bankruptcy rules was “economy,”19 which placed “conservatism of the estate and
return to creditors” above all other factors.20 Under the old rules, professionals were
compensated “on a quantum meruit basis.”21 In enacting the reform, Congress
reasoned that qualified specialists who could earn higher fees in other fields would
leave the bankruptcy arena if the limits on professionals‟ compensation remained
unchanged.22 Furthermore, the benefit of quality representation and efficient
management to both the debtor and creditor far exceeded the savings of arbitrary fee

Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. (92 Stat. 2549) 5787,
5965.
18

This principle is commonly referred to as “conservation of the estate and economy of
administration.” Seiler v. First Nat‟l Bank of Babbitt (In re Benassi), 72 B.R. 44, 47 (D. Minn. 1987)
(citing In re Penn-Dixie Indus., 18 B.R. 834, 838 (S.D.N.Y. 1982)); Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978,
Pub. L. No. 95-598, 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. (92 Stat. 2549) 5787, 6286. Numerous other names exist for
this principle. See, e.g., GEORGE M. TREISTER ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF BANKRUPTCY LAW 105
(American Law Institute 1996) (referring to the “economy principle”); Leif M. Clark, Paying the Piper:
Rethinking Professional Compensation in Bankruptcy, 1 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 231, 231-32 (1993)
(referring to the “economy standard”); McCullough, supra note 15, at 134 (referring to the “spirit of
economy”).
19

McCullough, supra note 15, at 134. McCullough cites to Mass. Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Brock, as an
illustration of this principle. Id. at 134 n.3 (citing Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Brock, 405 F.2d 429,
432-33 (5th Cir. 1968)). In Brock, the court remanded fee awards in which the lower court had
considered the time involved, the complexity of the case, and the results obtained, but abused its
discretion by failing to consider “the public interest which is inherent in bankruptcy matters . . . .” Id.
(citing Mass. Mutual Life Ins., 405 F.2d at 432-33).
20

In re Benassi, 72 B.R. at 47; 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY § 328.02, at 328-4 (Lawrence P. King et al.
eds., 15th ed., 1996); see also Moshein v. Beverly Crest Convalescent Hosp., Inc. (In re Beverly Crest
Convalescent Hosp., Inc.), 548 F.2d 817, 821 (9th Cir. 1976) (amended Mar. 2, 1977), superseded by
statute, 11 U.S.C. § 330 (1978) (reducing fee award to the hourly rate of a district judge).
21

In re Benassi, 72 B.R. at 47; Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. (92 Stat. 2549) 5787, 6286; Clark, supra note 19, at 232 (“[B]ankruptcy professionals
were expected to be paid less for their services than they would receive in other kinds of work. As a
result, many able professionals simply avoided bankruptcy work altogether . . . .”).
22
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23
cuts. Thus, Congress explicitly abandoned the principle of economy and allowed
professionals to be compensated as in any other field.24
Four provisions of the reformed Code deal with the employment and
compensation of professionals.25 First, § 327 authorizes the trustee, subject to the
court‟s approval, to employ professionals to represent or assist the trustee in
performing services for the estate.26 These professionals include, but are not limited
to, attorneys, accountants, appraisers, and auctioneers.27 Second, § 328 authorizes
the trustee or an appointed committee, with the court‟s approval, to employ a

23

In re Benassi, 72 B.R. at 47; McCullough, supra note 15, at 138.

Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. (92 Stat. 2549) 5787, 6286
(“The effect . . . is to overrule . . . cases that require fees to be determined based on notions of
conservation of the estate and economy of administration.”). Furthermore, the House bill was passed
over the Senate‟s version of the bill. McCullough, supra note 15, at 137. The Senate Report stated,
“[t]he compensation is to be reasonable, for economy in administration is the basic objective.”
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. (92 Stat. 2549) 5787, 5826.
The Senate reasoned that “persons of merit and quality have not eschewed public service in
bankruptcy cases merely because bankruptcy courts, in the interest of economy in administration,
have not allowed them compensation that may be earned in the private economy of business or the
professions.” Id. However, as mentioned, the House bill that was passed explicitly repudiated both
of these ideas. Id. at 6286; BANKRUPTCY CODE, RULES & OFFICIAL FORMS 115 (Thomson West
2007) (“[T]he policy of this section is to compensate attorneys and other professionals . . . at the same
rate as the attorney or other professional would be compensated . . . . Contrary language in the
Senate report . . . is rejected . . . .”). But cf. McCullough, supra note 15, at 152 (“Cuts of this kind, made
without consideration of reasonable necessity, suggest that courts maintain a lingering adherence to
the economy principle of the Act.”).
24

These provisions, §§ 327, 328, 330, and 331, were enacted as part of the 1978 Bankruptcy Reform
Act. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. (92 Stat. 2549) 5787,
6284-87. While all but § 331 have since been amended, none of the amendments substantively
changed the statutes for the purpose of this Article. Compare 11 U.S.C. § 330(a) (1978) (the initial
provisions enacted) with 11 U.S.C. § 330(a) (2006) (incorporating amendments from 1984, 1986, 1994,
and 2005). See generally Cynthia A. Baker, Fixing What’s Broken: A Proposal for Reform of the Compensation
System in Bankruptcy, 5 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 435, 435-36 (1996) (suggesting that the Bankruptcy
Reform Act of 1994 “tightened the standards” of professional compensation in bankruptcy but did
not resolve its inherent problems).
25

11 U.S.C. § 327(a) (2007); see also William H. Gindin, Professionals in Bankruptcy Proceedings:
Appointment, Right to Compensation and Conflicts of Interest, 21 SETON HALL L. REV. 895 (1991) (discussing
appointment of professionals under § 327).
26

27

11 U.S.C. § 327(a).
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professional on any reasonable terms and conditions.28 These terms and conditions
include performing work “on a retainer, on an hourly basis, on a fixed or percentage
fee basis, or on a contingent fee basis.”29 If approved, the terms of employment can
only be altered if they “prove to have been improvident in light of developments not
capable of being anticipated at the time of the fixing of such terms and conditions.”30
This provision altered settled practices. Under the previous rules, compensation was
subject to the uncertainty of what a court would decide the work was worth after it
was completed.31 Furthermore, contingency fee contracts were often invalidated.32
Thus, § 328 provides professionals a means for predictability in their compensation.33
Third, § 330, subject to § 328, allows a court to award “reasonable
compensation” to a professional.34 Section 330(a)(3) provides six factors that a court
may use to determine a reasonable compensation.35 Congress further emphasized its
intent to abandon the “economy principle” by making comparable compensation in
cases other than bankruptcy one of the six factors.36 Lastly, § 331 allows a
professional to be paid on an interim basis.37

11 U.S.C. § 328(a) (2007); see also Landry & Higdon, supra note 6, at 538-39 (discussing use of §
328(a)).
28

29

11 U.S.C. § 328(a).

30

Id.

Donaldson Lufkin & Jenrette Sec. Corp. v. Nat‟l Gypsum Co. (In re Nat‟l Gypsum Co.), 123 F.3d
861, 862 (5th Cir. 1997).
31

Seiler v. First Nat‟l Bank of Babbitt (In re Benassi), 72 B.R. 44, 46-47 (D. Minn. 1987) (citing
Watkins v. Sedberry, 261 U.S. 571, 575 (1923)).
32

33

In re Nat‟l Gypsum Co., 123 F.3d at 862; Landry & Higdon, supra note 6, at 539.

34

11 U.S.C. § 330(a)(1) (2007).

11 U.S.C. § 330(a)(3). These factors are: (1) “the time spent on such services;” (2) “the rates
charged for such services;” (3) whether the services were necessary or beneficial; (4) whether the
services were performed in a timely manner; (5) the qualifications and experience of the professional;
and (6) the rates charged by “comparably skilled practitioners” in non-bankruptcy fields. Id.
35

36

11 U.S.C. § 330(a)(3)(F); Landry & Higdon, supra note 6, 543-44.

11 U.S.C. § 331 (2007). Without the ability for interim compensation, professionals were often
forced to wait—sometimes for years—before receiving compensation. McCullough, supra note 15, at
144. “This policy impaired efficient administration of the bankruptcy estate by forcing attorneys to
37
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In summary, Congress created two approaches for professionals to establish
a fee arrangement.38 The first approach “is to request a retention order under [§] 328
that fixes the terms and conditions of the employment.”39 Approval occurs before
any services have been rendered.40 Once granted, the terms and conditions set forth
in the court order govern compensation unless the bankruptcy court makes a finding
of “improvidence” under § 328.41 The second approach “is to request approval to
be employed” but reserve compensation issues until the filing of the fee
application.42 Once the fee application is filed, the court awards reasonable
compensation according to § 330.43 In adopting these two approaches, Congress
sought to increase compensation to market levels for the express purpose of
“attracting highly qualified professionals to the bankruptcy arena.”44
III. DIVERGENCE AMONG THE CIRCUITS
In most bankruptcy cases a flat fee is charged.45 As a result, problems
regarding compensation typically only arise in the more complex Chapter 11 cases 46
„lend‟ their services to the estate: unlike other attorneys, although they received no compensation
while they worked on a case, they were of course still required to pay salaries and office overhead.”
Id.
See also Landry & Higdon, supra note 6, at 541. Compare 11 U.S.C. § 328(a) (2007) (fixing the terms
of employment in advance) with 11 U.S.C. § 330(a) (allowing a court to award reasonable
compensation after services are completed).
38

39

Landry & Higdon, supra note 6, at 541.

40

Seiler v. First Nat‟l Bank of Babbitt (In re Benassi), 72 B.R. 44, 47 (D. Minn. 1987).

41

Id.

42

Landry & Higdon, supra note 6, at 541.

43

Id.

44

In re Benassi, 72 B.R. at 49.

45

Landry & Higdon, supra note 6, at 537.

Id. at 538. Chapter 11 cases generally deal with debtor rehabilitation or reorganization. DAVID G.
EPSTEIN, BANKRUPTCY AND RELATED LAW IN A NUTSHELL 125 (West 7th ed. 2005). In a Chapter
11 case, the debtor retains possession of its assets and makes payments to creditors according to a
court approved plan. Id. at 126.
46
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or when a professional is hired for a special purpose.47 However, even in those
cases, a bankruptcy court generally reviews a professional‟s fee application under §
330 after services have been provided.48 Thus, application of § 328 causes most of
the problems. As stated above, § 328 permits a professional to seek court approval
of specific terms and conditions of compensation at the time of application for
employment.49 Approval is discretionary.50 However, if granted, the retention order
should state that employment is granted under § 328 and set forth the express terms
and conditions that apply.51 While this is a routine matter in some districts, it is not a
universal practice.52 Thus, an order granting employment can be ambiguous as to
whether it is approving both the professional‟s employment and compensation, or
simply the professional‟s employment.53 Appellate courts have fashioned default
rules to deal with such ambiguity.54 These default rules can be understood by
looking at the precedents of two circuits: the Ninth Circuit and the Fifth Circuit.55
A. Ninth Circuit
In In re B.U.M. International, Inc., the debtor filed an application to employ a
financial consultant who would receive a combination of both a monthly and a
contingency fee.56 The bankruptcy court initially approved the application.57
47

Landry & Higdon, supra note 6, at 538.

F.V. Steel & Wire Co. v. Houlihan Lokey Howard & Zukin Capital L.P., 350 B.R. 835, 838-39 (E.D.
Wis. 2006).
48

49

11 U.S.C. § 328(a).

50

Landry & Higdon, supra note 6, at 544.

51

Id. at 546-47.

52

Id.

53

Id. at 547.

54

Id.

The Sixth Circuit has approached this differently. See Nischwitz v. Miskovic (In re Airspect Air,
Inc.), 385 F.3d 915, 922 (6th Cir. 2004) (“We hold that whether a court „pre-approves‟ a fee
arrangement under § 328 should be judged by the totality of the circumstances, looking at both the
application and the bankruptcy court‟s order.”).
55

Friedman Enters., Inc. v. B.U.M. Int‟l, Inc. (In re B.U.M. Int‟l, Inc.), 229 F.3d 824, 825 (9th Cir.
2000). The agreement called for $7,500 per month, plus expenses, and contingency fees based on the
56
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However, after objections were filed, the court conducted a hearing and determined
that each professional employed under § 327 may have his fees reviewed for
reasonableness once all services were rendered.58 One month later, the court entered
an order approving the employment with “an additional proviso that „all fees and
costs of [the consultant] are subject to Court approval.”‟59 When the consultant
finished rendering services, he submitted a fee application.60 Although the monthly
fees were approved, the court conducted a § 330 reasonableness evaluation and
denied the contingency fee in its entirety.61 The district court affirmed.62
On review, the court of appeals first stated that “[t]here is no question that a
bankruptcy court may not conduct a § 330 inquiry into the reasonableness of the fees
and their benefit to the estate if the court already has approved the professional‟s
employment under 11 U.S.C. § 328.”63 Second, the court noted that neither the
application for employment nor the court‟s order referred to either § 328 or § 330. 64
Third, the court acknowledged the order‟s “proviso” making fees and costs subject
to court approval.65 Finally, the court held that “while the bankruptcy court may
have conditionally approved [the professional‟s] employment, it did not convey its
complete approval under § 328.”66 Because the court “specifically reserved the right

value of the secured debt, unsecured debt, unsecured trade debt, consideration received by the
company, and capital. Id. at 825-26.
57

Id. at 826.

58

Id.

59

Id.

60

Id. at 827.

Id. Through this evaluation, the court concluded “that [the professional‟s services] had not
benefited the estate.” Id.
61

62

Id.

63

Id. at 829 (citing Pitrat v. Reimers (In re Reimers), 972 F.2d 1127, 1128 (9th Cir. 1992)).

64

Id.

65

Id.

66

Id.
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to review the fees,” a § 330 review was proper.67 The court distinguished the
circumstances of In re B.U.M. International, Inc. from an earlier decision, In re Reimers.68
Unlike In re Reimers, the court reasoned that the bankruptcy court‟s language put the
professional on notice that the court had only conditionally approved the fee
structure.69 However, the court commented that, in the future, the bankruptcy court
should either accept or reject the fee agreement and not make acceptance
conditional, as this would allow professionals to “know exactly where they stood
before undertaking the engagement.”70
Similarly, in In re Circle K, a creditor‟s committee sought to employ a financial
advising company.71 The retainer agreement specified that the company would be
paid $100,000 per month.72 Although the agreement acknowledged that any
compensation remained subject to a final fee application, it did not refer to § 328.73
The bankruptcy court approved the employment in a retention order that mentioned
neither § 328 nor § 330.74 On submission of the company‟s fee application, the court
67

Id. at 829, 831.

Id. at 829. In Reimers, the trustee requested the bankruptcy court‟s permission to employ an
attorney. In re Reimers, 972 F.2d at 1127. The fee agreement between the parties provided that the
attorney would be paid forty percent of the amount he recovered in litigating a claim for the debtor
estate. Id. at 1127-28. The court approved both the employment and the fee arrangement in the same
order. Id. at 1128. The professional successfully recovered $37,871.30, but when he applied for his
fee, the court estimated an hourly rate and awarded him only $6,000. Id. Both the trustee and the
professional filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied. Id. The district court affirmed. Id.
On further appeal, the court stated that once a bankruptcy court approves a fee arrangement under §
328, it cannot alter that arrangement without first finding “unanticipated developments” that render
the original terms improvident. Id. Thus, the court held that the award was improper. Id. at 1128,
1129.
68

69

In re B.U.M. Int‟l, Inc., 229 F.3d at 829.

Id. This is somewhat contradictive because the court previously stated that the conditional language
in the order gave the professional notice that it was not approved under § 328.
70

Circle K Corp. v. Houlihan, Lokey, Howard & Zukin, Inc. (In re Circle K Corp.), 279 F.3d 669, 672
(9th Cir. 2001) (amended Jan. 30, 2002).
71

72

Id.

Id. The exact language is: “[a]ll fees so paid remain subject to subsequent Bankruptcy Court
approval in a final fee application to be submitted to the Court.” Id.
73

74

Id.
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conducted a reasonableness review and awarded half of the requested fees.75
However, on appeal, the district court reversed.76 The court held that the company
had been approved under § 328, and, without a finding of “improvidence,” must be
awarded its requested fees.77
The court of appeals disagreed.78 First, the court stated that the facts of the
case before it were similar to In re B.U.M. International, Inc.79 Second, the court noted
the lack of reference to § 328 in the application and the “subject to” language in both
the application and the order.80 The court held that “the bankruptcy court had only
conditionally approved the employment agreement and that § 330 review was
therefore appropriate.”81 Further, the court cited the treatment of another
professional in the same proceeding82 as well as the bankruptcy court‟s belief that it
had only conditionally approved the company‟s fee agreement in support of its
conclusion.83 The court explicitly disagreed with the Fifth Circuit‟s holding in In re
National Gypsum Co., discussed below.84

Id. The professional “submitted its first Final Fee Application „pursuant to Sections 327 and 330,‟”
rather than pursuant to § 328. Id. at 672 n.3. However, an amended fee application stated that § 328
was the appropriate standard. Id. The debtor contended that because the professional first cited §
330, “it should be judicially estopped from now arguing that § 328 applies.” Id. The court refused to
resolve this issue in light of its other holdings. Id.
75

76

Id. at 672.

77

Id.

78

Id. at 673.

79

Id.

80

Id.

81

Id.

Id. That professional explicitly cited § 328 in his application and the court‟s order stated that
payments “shall be subject to the right of the Bankruptcy Court under 11 U.S.C. § 328(a) to review
such payments.” Id.
82

83

Id.

84

Id. at 673-74.
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B. Fifth Circuit
In In re National Gypsum Co., the debtor applied85 to employ a professional at a
rate of $125,000 per month.86 The bankruptcy court issued an order approving both
the employment and terms of payment but stated that it “retain[ed] the right to
consider and approve the reasonableness and amount of [the professional‟s] fees on
both an interim and final basis.”87 After the professional submitted a fee application,
the court reduced the amount requested by $400,000.88 The court believed the lower
figure represented “reasonable compensation in the light of hourly compensation
that had been allowed in similar bankruptcy cases in the same district.”89 The district
court affirmed, holding that review was appropriate because the bankruptcy court
had only conditionally approved the fee agreement.90
On further review, the court of appeals reiterated Congress‟ impetus in
enacting § 328: “Prior to 1978[,] the most able professionals were often unwilling to
work for bankruptcy estates where their compensation would be subject to the
uncertainties of what a judge thought the work was worth after it had been done.” 91
The court stated that the same uncertainty remained under § 330 but could be
avoided by obtaining the court‟s approval under § 328.92 Thus, “[i]f the most
competent professionals are to be available . . . they must know what they will
If a trustee is not appointed in a Chapter 11 case, the debtor is a debtor-in-possession. EPSTEIN,
supra note 46, at 131. In this position, the debtor stands in as the trustee and can employ a
professional under § 327. COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 21, at § 327.01, at 327-4 n-1 to 3275.
85

Donaldson Lufkin & Jenrette Sec. Corp. v. Nat‟l Gypsum Co. (In re Nat‟l Gypsum Co.), 123 F.3d
861, 862 (5th Cir. 1997).
86

87

Id.

Id. The professional claimed it was owed $2,825,000 by virtue of the agreed monthly
compensation. Id. However, the debtor objected to this amount and the parties agreed to reduce the
compensation to $2,400,000. Id. The bankruptcy court further reduced this figure by $400,000 to
$2,000,000. Id.
88

89

Id.

90

Id.

91

Id.

Id. The court recognized that § 328 approval could still be reviewed under the “improvident”
standard of § 328. Id.
92
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receive . . . . Courts must protect those agreements and expectations, once found to
be acceptable.”93
Turning to the case before it, the court noted that the bankruptcy court
could have approved the professional‟s retention and left compensation to be
determined under § 330.94 Instead, the court expressly approved the compensation
agreement. 95 The court held that the bankruptcy court granted § 328 approval and
that the order‟s contingency language only “recited [the bankruptcy court‟s] control
of compensation in the event of subsequent and unanticipated circumstances . . . .”96
The court remanded for an award in accordance with § 328.97
Similarly, in In re Texas Securities, Inc., the trustee employed a law firm as
special litigation counsel.98 The employment order provided that compensation
would be forty percent of all assets recovered but did not specify whether § 328 or §
330 governed.99 Slightly more than a year later, the bankruptcy court modified the
order.100 The new order established a combination of contingent fee and hourly fee
compensation but did not set a specific rate of payment.101 In the modifying order,
the court specified that “it „[did] not modify, in any respect, [the court‟s] authority to
review this and all employment orders in accordance with Section 328 of the Bankruptcy

93

Id. at 862-63.

94

Id. at 863.

95

Id.

96

Id.

97

Id.

Peele v. Cunningham (In re Tex. Sec., Inc.), 218 F.3d 443, 444 (5th Cir. 2000). Later, a single
attorney replaced the firm. Id.
98

99

Id.

100

Id. The initial order, dated April 6, 1994, was modified on October 20, 1995. Id.

101

See id. at 444-45.
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Code.‟”102 After the final fee application was submitted, the court conducted a § 330
evaluation and reduced the award.103 The district court affirmed.104
The court of appeals, citing In re National Gypsum Co., stated that „“[i]f prior
approval is given to a certain compensation, § 328 controls . . . .”‟105 The court
reiterated this holding stating “[s]ection 328 applies when the bankruptcy court
approves a particular rate or means of payment, and § 330 applies when the court
does not do so.”106 The court then reasoned that because both orders approved
compensation structures governed by § 328, a reasonableness review was
improper.107 Thus, the court reversed, instructing the bankruptcy court to recalculate
the professional‟s fees in accordance with § 328 and to set the hourly rate at the rate
the law firm charged on the date the modifying order went into effect.108
C. Summary
In cases where it is ambiguous as to whether § 328 or § 330 governs a
professional‟s compensation, the Ninth Circuit and the Fifth Circuit are in conflict.109
In the Ninth Circuit, if a bankruptcy court includes conditional language in the
retention order, then § 330 governs a professional‟s fees, regardless of whether the

102

Id. at 445.

103

Id.

104

Id.

Id. (citing Donaldson Lufkin & Jenrette Sec. Corp. v. Nat‟l Gypsum Co. (In re Nat‟l Gypsum Co.),
123 F.3d 861, 862-63 (5th Cir. 1997)).
105

Id. The court also stated that “[o]nce the bankruptcy court has approved a rate or means of
payment, such as a contingent fee, the court cannot on the submission of the final fee application
instead approve a „reasonable‟ fee under § 330(a), unless the bankruptcy court finds that the original
arrangement was improvident due to unanticipated circumstances as required by § 328(a).” Id. at 44546.
106

107

Id. at 446.

See id. at 444-46. One judge dissented and argued that because the modifying order did not set a
rate of compensation, the bankruptcy court should be allowed to set a reasonable rate, under § 330,
for the post-modifying order compensation. See id. at 446, 448.
108

109

See supra Part II.A-B.
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court pre-approves a fee arrangement.110 In contrast, in the Fifth Circuit, § 328
governs a professional‟s fees if a court pre-approves a fee arrangement, regardless of
whether it includes conditional language or only states a means of payment. 111
However, conditional language is not the only source of ambiguity. Determining
whether a court has pre-approved a fee arrangement or added conditional language
to the order may also result in ambiguity. Thus, neither the Ninth Circuit nor the
Fifth Circuit provide bankruptcy courts or professionals a clear indication of when §
328 will govern an ambiguous retention order.
IV. THE CAUSE OF AMBIGUOUS RETENTION ORDERS
The problem of deciding between ex ante and ex post compensation is a
familiar one in service occupations. Each fee structure has its unique advantages.
For example, in the construction industry, the two common forms of contracts are
the lump-sum contract and the cost-plus contract.112 In a lump-sum contract, the
parties negotiate a fixed price before the project begins.113 As long as the contract is
for a standard project, the lump-sum contract promotes efficiency.114 In contrast, a
cost-plus contract compensates the contractor for actual costs and a percentage of
the total cost of the project upon completion.115 The main advantage of a cost-plus
contract is the ability to begin construction with incomplete design information.116
Thus, “[t]he type of fee structure employed depends on the type of project, the goals
of the parties, and the willingness of certain parties to accept the risk of either
Circle K Corp. v. Houlihan, Lokey, Howard & Zukin, Inc. (In re Circle K Corp.), 279 F.3d 669, 673
(9th Cir. 2001) (amended Jan. 30, 2002); Friedman Enters., Inc. v. B.U.M. Int‟l, Inc. (In re B.U.M. Int‟l,
Inc.), 229 F.3d 824, 825 (9th Cir. 2000).
110

111In

re Tex. Sec., Inc., 218 F.3d at 444; In re Nat‟l Gypsum Co., 123 F.3d at 863 (5th Cir. 1997).

THE CONSTRUCTION CONTRACTS BOOK: HOW TO FIND COMMON GROUND IN NEGOTIATING
DESIGN AND CONSTRUCTION CONTRACT CLAUSES 122 (Daniel S. Brennan et al. eds., 2004)
(hereinafter “THE CONSTRUCTION CONTRACT BOOK”); see also JAMES ACRET, ATTORNEY‟S GUIDE
TO CALIFORNIA CONSTRUCTION CONTRACTS AND DISPUTES § 2.4 (2d ed. 1990) (identifying lumpsum contracts, cost-plus contracts, and cost-plus with a guaranteed maximum as the main types of
construction contracts when classified according to method of pricing).
112

113

FUNDAMENTALS OF CONSTRUCTION LAW 20 (Carina Y. Enhada et al. eds., 2001).

114

KEITH COLLIER, CONSTRUCTION CONTRACTS 71-72 (3d ed. 2001).

115

FUNDAMENTALS OF CONSTRUCTION LAW, supra note 113, at 21.

116

COLLIER, supra note 114, at 86.
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overpayment . . . or underpayment . . . for the . . . services provided.”117 Similarly, §§
328 and 330 each provide a distinct set of advantages for both professionals and
bankruptcy courts.
A. Advantages of § 328 Ex Ante Compensation
Section 328 provides a mechanism for bankruptcy courts to approve the
terms and conditions of a professional‟s compensation before any services have been
rendered.118 Advantages of this ex ante form of compensation include rewarding
entrepreneurship, compensating the professional for opportunity costs, allowing the
professional to manage risk, and reducing transaction costs.
1. Entrepreneurship
Ex ante compensation provides a reward for entrepreneurship. Section 328
allows the professional to receive approval of specific terms and conditions of
employment.119 This creates an incentive for qualified professionals to locate the
opportunities within the bankruptcy system where they can provide the most value.
For example, if a professional works for a contingency fee based on the amount of
assets drawn into the bankrupt estate, the professional will seek out the estate in
which the greatest potential for assets exists. Both the professional and the
bankruptcy system benefit as particular problems are matched with particular skill
sets.
2. Opportunity Costs
For professionals, the ex ante fee structure also compensates for opportunity
costs associated with business that cannot be completed because of the bankruptcy
employment. By seeking a retention order from a bankruptcy court, the professional

THE CONSTRUCTION CONTRACTS BOOK, supra note 112, at 201; see also JAMES ACRET,
CALIFORNIA CONSTRUCTION CONTRACTS AND DISPUTES §§ 2.12-2.13 (3d ed. 2006) (comparing
briefly the advantages of the cost-plus arrangement to the advantages of the lump-sum form of
payment); COLLIER, supra note 114, at 70-72, 86-87 (explaining the advantages and disadvantages of
lump-sum and cost-plus contracts); Steven N.S. Cheung, Transaction Costs, Risk Aversion, and the Choice
of Contractual Arrangements, 12 J.L. & ECON. 23 (1969) (discussing the choice between types of contracts
in agriculture).
117

118

Landry & Higdon, supra note 6, at 538-39.

119

11 U.S.C. § 328(a) (2007).
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foregoes potential future business for the time period spent on that particular case.120
Section 328 allows a professional to evaluate whether the terms and conditions of a
particular employment are worth the lost opportunities.
3. Risk
Ex ante compensation allows professionals to manage risk. Professionals can
ask for increased fees or more certain compensation schemes121 if they anticipate an
employment to be a particularly risky venture. This allows professionals to balance
increased risk against increased or more certain reward.
4. Transaction Costs
An additional benefit of ex ante compensation is a reduction in transaction
costs.
Professionals in bankruptcy are required to maintain and submit to the
court detailed time records of all services rendered as part of their ex post fee
applications.123 The resources of the court are unduly drained in reviewing these
records, especially in large cases, 124 and an expert is often needed to comply with §
330‟s review process.125 Furthermore, attorneys are compensated for the time spent
preparing and defending fee applications.126 As with all professional fees, this
122

See In re Merry-Go-Round Enters., Inc., 244 B.R. 327, 331 (Bankr. D. Md. 2000) (noting that the
professional agreed that the representation of the estate would be given priority).
120

121

See 11 U.S.C. § 328(a) (allowing any reasonable terms and conditions).

But see generally David M. Driesen & Shubha Ghosh, The Functions of Transaction Costs: Rethinking
Transaction Cost Minimization in a World of Friction, 47 ARIZ. L. REV. 61, 64 (2005) (stating that
“[r]educing transactions costs carries risks of reducing the benefits that these costs purchase.”).
122

McCullough, supra note 15, 145-46 (requiring a detailed fee application and stating that “[a]t the
very least, every fee application must contain a specific analysis of each task performed”). See generally
Pitrat v. Reimers (In re Reimers), 972 F.2d 1127, 1128 (9th Cir. 1992) (requiring submission of
additional documentation when requested by the court); In re Motor Freight Express, 80 B.R. 44, 46
(Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1987) (“In the case of photocopying, counsel should inform the Court of the
number of copies, the cost of each copy, and provide, if possible a breakdown of the reasons why
photocopying of certain documents was necessary.”).
123

124

Landry & Higdon, supra note 6, at 567.

11 U.S.C. § 330(a)(3) (2007) (outlining the factors used to award reasonable compensation); 11
U.S.C. § 330(a)(4)(A)(i) (prohibiting compensation for duplicative services); 11 U.S.C. §
330(a)(4)(A)(ii) (outlawing fees for services that were unnecessary or unlikely to benefit the estate).
125

126

In re Nucorp Energy, Inc., 764 F.2d 655, 662 (9th Cir. 1985); McCullough, supra note 15, 149.
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additional compensation is paid out of the bankrupt estate.127 While ex ante approval
does require hearings to set the fee arrangement, such hearings are less time
consuming than the review of “voluminous fee applications” associated with ex post
review.128
B. Advantages of § 330 Ex Post Compensation
Section 330 provides a mechanism by which bankruptcy courts can approve
a professional‟s employment but reserve compensation issues until after the services
have been rendered.129 Advantages of this ex post form of compensation include
reducing the bankruptcy court‟s information costs, reducing collusion among
trustees and professionals, and preventing strategic withholding by creditors.
1. Information Costs
Ex post compensation reduces the court‟s information costs. It is impossible
for courts to know the complete nature of the professional‟s employment before the
services have been rendered.130 Because courts have limited information when
attempting to predict the value of future services, they are more efficient at awarding
reasonable compensation ex post rather than ex ante. While courts may not know
the exact nature of the services after they are completed, ex post compensation
reduces much of the information costs associated with valuation.
2. Collusion
Ex post compensation prevents collusion between trustees and professionals.
The bankruptcy system provides little incentive for a trustee to limit a professional‟s
fee award. First, if both the trustee and the professional are repeat players in the
bankruptcy arena, the trustee is unlikely to “bargain down” the professional‟s

127

In re Nucorp Energy, Inc., 764 F.2d at 662.

Landry & Higdon, supra note 6, at 567. Furthermore, bankruptcy courts are likely to become more
efficient in § 328 hearings as a precedent of allowing and disallowing various compensation schemes
under § 328 develops.
128

129

Id. at 541; see 11 U.S.C. 328(a) (2006).

See 11 U.S.C. 328(a) (allowing for modification of pre-approved terms and conditions if they
“prove to have been improvident in light of developments not capable of being anticipated at the time of the
fixing of such terms and conditions”) (emphasis added).
130
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requested compensation. Second, in Chapter 7 and Chapter 11 cases,131 the court
awards the trustee compensation according to § 326:132
The court may allow reasonable compensation . . . after the trustee
renders such services, not to exceed 25 percent on the first $5,000 or
less, 10 percent on any amount in excess of $5,000 but not in excess
of $50,000, 5 percent on any amount in excess of $50,000 but not in
excess of $1,000,000, and reasonable compensation not to exceed 3
percent of such moneys in excess of $1,000,000, upon all moneys
disbursed or turned over in the case by the trustee to parties in
interest, excluding the debtor, but including holders of secured
claims.133
“Although these percentages were intended as limits on reasonable compensation, in
practice they sometimes work like commissions . . . .”134 Thus, the trustee has a
monetary stake in the amount brought into the estate, possibly aligning the trustee‟s
interests with the professional rather than the bankruptcy court. By allowing courts
to evaluate the services after they are performed, and not as they are described by the
trustee and the professional, ex post compensation mitigates the potential negative
effects of collusion.
3. Strategic Withholding
Ex post compensation also prevents strategic withholding by creditors.
Especially in Chapter 11 cases, creditors do not have an incentive to object to a
professional‟s compensation even if the professional‟s services are unlikely to
provide value.135 “In bankruptcy, the absolute priority rule combined with an
Chapter 7 and Chapter 11 are the most common forms of large bankruptcies. E PSTEIN, supra note
46, at 124-26. The other three forms, Chapters 9, 12, and 13, deal, respectively, with government
entities as debtors, family farmer bankruptcies, and individuals with “regular income,” unsecured debt
of less than $307,675, and secured debt of less than $922,975. Id. at 124, 126.
131

11 U.S.C. § 326(a) (2007). Compensation of officers is awarded under § 330 which incorporates §
326. 11 U.S.C. § 330(a)(1) (2007).
132

133

11 U.S.C. § 326 (2007).

134

TREISTER ET AL., supra note 19, at 107.

135

I am perhaps understating the problem. Bankruptcy Judge Harold Lavien asks:
[W]ho is there to help the court make these [fee] evaluations? Counsel may have
fought bitterly during the case, but now each is self-interested in not rocking the
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administrative expense priority for all professional costs requires the „last class in the
money‟ to pay all [professional] fees incurred in the case . . . .” 136 The “last class in
the money” refers to the creditor who is last in line to receive payment and would
receive payment but for the professional fees.137 Which creditor is the “last class in
the money” remains uncertain as long as doubt remains regarding the debtor‟s
value.138 In terms of a bankruptcy professional, as long as that professional‟s services
will bring some benefit to the estate, the debtor‟s value will remain uncertain. Thus,
with ex ante compensation, creditors withhold information they have regarding the
professional‟s services on the assumption that they will enjoy any benefit the services
provide without incurring any of the cost.139 Ex post compensation prevents this
effect. Since an ex post award occurs after the services have been performed, a
creditor will know if it is the “last class in the money.” Thus, at least this creditor
will have an incentive to object to an excessive fee.
boat. As a matter of fact, an argument might be made that counsel for the debtor,
and certainly for the creditor‟s committee is, at the time of the fee hearing, in a
conflict of interest position between his self-interest in his fee and his responsibility
to his client. The courts, until the 1978 Code at least, could fall back on the
economic spirit of bankruptcy, but even that has been stripped away by Congress.
Harold Lavien, Fees as Seen from the Bankruptcy Bench, 89 COM. L. J. 136, 136 (1984).
Furthermore, Judge Lavien states that fee hearings in bankruptcy are not adversary proceedings.
[S]eldom is there more than a cursory objection submitted to the court in any fee
hearing. After all, it is the nebulous estate‟s money, and tomorrow‟s counsel for
the creditors‟ committee may be in the position of debtor‟s counsel. Therefore, fee
hearings become a mutual admiration society which may be explained as human
nature . . . .
Id. at 137-38; see also Peter Lattman & Henny Sender, Bankruptcy Fees Face Legal Test In Collins &
Aikman Billing Case, WALL ST. J., Dec. 14, 2006, at A15 (stating that creditor challenges to professional
fees are rare).
136

Baker, supra note 25, at 437.

137

Id. at 442-43.

138

Id. at 448.

Id. Baker suggests that lower priority classes either do not know they are the
money” because of doubts regarding the debtor‟s value or if they do know,
professional‟s employment is their only road to recovery. Id. Furthermore, the
associated with objecting to the professional‟s fees make an objection less likely to
creditor is not hindered by the other obstacles. Id.
139

“last class in the
believe that the
transaction costs
occur even if the
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C. Seeking the Advantages of Both Ex Ante and Ex Post Compensation
By attempting to combine the advantages of both §§ 328 and 330,
bankruptcy courts are writing ambiguous retention orders. Bankruptcy courts likely
prefer to approve a professional‟s employment under § 330 because of the
advantages outlined above. However, bankruptcy courts also recognize that if they
are accurate in their ex ante evaluations, § 328 reduces transaction costs and appeases
those professionals applying for pre-approval. As a result, many bankruptcy courts
are strategically drafting ambiguous retention orders in an attempt to procure the
advantages of both approaches. These orders purport to approve the professional‟s
compensation under § 328 but reserve the court‟s ability to make an ex post
reasonableness evaluation if the compensation looks excessive.
In re Vern D. Blanchard provides a recent example. 140 In that case, the trustee
filed an application to employ an attorney to litigate various claims for the estate. 141
The bankruptcy court approved employment and a fifty percent contingency fee142 in
an order stating that “compensation was „subject to further court approval after due
notice and hearing, and subject to the provisions of Bankruptcy Code sections 328
and 330 . . . .”‟143 The professional obtained a default judgment for $14,631,640 and
successfully recovered assets in excess of the total claims against the debtor. 144 The
debtor was the only party to object to the fee application.145
In reviewing the professional‟s fee application, the bankruptcy court noted
that the retention application did not cite § 328.146 The court further explained that
“the order[,] while purporting to base the fees on section 328, also provided the
In re Vern D. Blanchard, No. 96-12037-H7 1 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. Dec. 19, 2005),
www.casb.uscourts.gov/pdf/96_12037m.pdf.
140

141

Id. at 2.

Id. at 103. There was disagreement as to whether the contingency fee applied to all assets
recovered or only those necessary to pay the creditors. Id. at 3. In either case, it appears that the fifty
percent number was not in dispute. Id.
142

143

Id. at 2 (citing Order ¶ 3).

144

Id. at 2, 3.

145

See id. at 3.

146

Id. at 10.
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court discretion to review the reasonableness of the fees pursuant to section 330.”147
Therefore, the bankruptcy court reasoned that because its own order had cited both
§§ 328 and 330, the order was ambiguous as to which section applied to the fee
application.148 Thus, the court conducted a § 330 reasonableness review.149
D. Consequences of Ambiguity
In attempting to gain the advantages of both §§ 328 and 330, bankruptcy
courts are creating a precedent of arbitrary enforcement that is likely to eliminate the
advantages that Congress intended to create by enacting § 328. Ambiguity can have
value.150 Ambiguous retention orders offer bankruptcy courts the advantages of
both §§ 328 and 330 by providing them a means for correcting inaccurate ex ante
approvals. However, this system only works if bankruptcy courts have a reputation
for fair enforcement. While bankruptcy courts have used ambiguous retention
orders to decrease excessive fees, they have not used the same mechanism to
increase meager fees.151 Thus, bankruptcy courts have only enforced the system in a
way that lowers professionals‟ pre-approved compensation.

147

Id. at 10-11.

148

Id.

Id. at 11 (citing Circle K Corp. v. Houlihan, Lokey, Howard & Zuken, Inc. (In re Circle K Corp.),
279 F.3d 669 (9th Cir. 2001) (amended Jan. 30, 2002)). After a reasonableness review, the court
concluded that the attorney was entitled to fifty percent “of the proceeds necessary to pay creditor
claims plus interest and administrative expenses.” Id. at 13. However, the court left the calculation of
the “exact dollar amount” to the trustee. Id. at 12.
149

Gillian K. Hadfield, Weighing the Value of Vagueness: An Economic Perspective on Precision in the Law, 82
CAL. L. REV. 541, 545 (1994) (recognizing the benefits of vagueness and stating that “vagueness, by
improving the ability of limitedly competent courts to control behavior optimally, may be
institutionally advantageous.”).
150

See Smith v. Lounsbury (In re Amberjack Interests, Inc.), 326 B.R. 379 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2005). In
Amberjack Interests, the court stated that even if it were to conduct a § 330 review, the result would not
be a higher fee award. Id. at 387. However, Amberjack Interests appears to be the only published
opinion in which a bankruptcy court has even considered whether to increase compensation
potentially governed by § 328. In contrast, numerous courts have decreased what they hold to be an
excessive § 328 fee. E.g., In re Susan L. Gilbertoson, 340 B.R. 618, 623 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 2006)
(holding that the early and easy resolution of the case made the pre-approved contingency fee
improvident). While it is possible that collusion between the trustee and the professional is so
extensive that professionals never underestimate the amount of work a particular employment will
entail, it is more likely that this situation is the result of bankruptcy courts surreptitiously enforcing the
“economy” principle. See generally McCullough, supra note 15 at 133, 138 (discussing the purported
abandonment of the old “spirit of economy” and finding that the “the legacy of the old approach
151
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Congress enacted § 328 to provide professionals with a means for
predictability.152 Ambiguous retention orders eliminate this predictability by blending
§§ 328 and 330 together. While the Fifth Circuit is more favorable to professionals
seeking § 328 approval than the Ninth Circuit, neither circuit‟s approach provides
professionals with a clear rule for when § 328 will govern. Thus, there is an
increased likelihood that highly qualified professionals who desire the advantages §
328 provides will once again leave the bankruptcy arena for more lucrative fields.
V. INTERPRETING AMBIGUOUS RETENTION ORDERS
The uncertainty created by ambiguous retention orders and the harm they
cause can be eliminated at the appellate level. To terminate this uncertainty,
retention orders should be viewed as contracts between bankruptcy courts and
professionals. In addition, reviewing courts should use contract law principles to
interpret ambiguous retention orders.
A. An Overview of Contract Law Principles
A contract is ambiguous on its face when it either has conflicting terms or
does not contain a provision covering the dispute that has arisen.153 In the first
instance, courts apply interpretive rules to determine what the contract says.154 In
the second, courts apply default rules to fill any gap.155 Arguably, no analytical
distinction exists between the two types of rules, and both can be classified as default
rules.156

persists as seen in the courts arbitrary reduction in attorneys‟ fees.”). In either case, only bankruptcy
courts are gaining an advantage from ambiguous retention orders which will affect professionals‟
behavior in deciding whether to accept a particular employment within the bankruptcy arena.
152

See supra notes 31-33 and accompanying text.

Eric A. Posner, The Parol Evidence Rule, the Plain Meaning Rule, and the Principles of Contractual
Interpretation, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 533, 535 (1998).
153

Eric A. Posner, There Are No Penalty Default Rules in Contract Law, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 563, 56566 (2006).
154

155

Id.

156

Id. at 566.
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There are two types of default rules:
majoritarian and penalty.157
Majoritarian default rules are further divided into two additional categories: tailored
and untailored.158 Tailored rules interpret ambiguous terms in a contract to mean
what is most efficient for the particular contract—they are individualized.159 In
contrast, untailored default rules interpret ambiguous terms in a contract to mean
what most parties would want in the contract—they are one-size-fits-all.160 Both
rules reduce the consequences of high transaction costs by allowing parties to enter
into incomplete contracts with the knowledge that courts will interpret the contract
in a manner that promotes efficiency.161
In contrast, penalty default rules interpret ambiguous terms in a contract to
mean what one party, or both, would not have wanted.162 Penalty default rules
promote complete contracts by discouraging the strategic withholding of
information among parties.163 In addition, the rules minimize the incentive for
“externalizing the cost of interpreting the contract on the courts.”164
Ian Ayres and Robert Gertner suggest that the choice of rule should be
governed by the reason for incompleteness.165 They identify two broad reasons for
See generally Ian Ayres, Default Rules for Incomplete Contracts, in 1 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY
ECONOMICS AND THE LAW, 586-87 (Peter Newman ed., 1998) (discussing the choice between
majoritarian and penalty default rules); Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling in Gaps in Incomplete
Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 91 (1989) (discussing penalty default
rules); Eric A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Contract Law After Three Decades: Success or Failure?, 112 YALE
L.J. 829 (2003) (describing the effect of choosing either majoritarian or penalty default rules).
157

OF

158

Ayres, supra note 157, at 586 (refers to untailored rules as “one-size-fits-all”).

159

Id. at 586; Posner, supra note 153, at 547.

160

Ayres, supra note 157, at 586; Posner, supra note 153, at 547.

161

See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 157, at 92-93; Posner, supra note 157, at 839.

Ayres & Gertner, supra note 157, at 91, 97; Posner, supra note 157, at 839. But see Posner, supra
note 154, 563 (arguing that penalty default rules do not exist).
162

163

Ayres & Gertner, supra note 157, at 91, 97; Posner, supra note 157, at 839.

164

Posner, supra note 157, at 839.

Ayres & Gertner, supra note 157, at 127 (“The first step . . . should be to ask „why does the gap
exist?‟”).
165
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incompleteness: strategic incompleteness and transaction costs. 166 Strategic
incompleteness is the withholding of information essential to form a complete
contract.167 Parties may strategically withhold information to gain a bargaining
advantage.168 To borrow Ayres and Gertner‟s metaphor, a party might withhold
information that would increase the overall size of the pie, in an effort to increase its
share of the pie.169 Transaction costs are the costs associated with both negotiating
and enforcing a contract.170 If the costs of contracting for a certain provision exceed
that provision‟s benefit, rational parties would leave the contract incomplete.171
According to Ayres and Gertner, when a gap exits because of strategic
incompleteness, a penalty default is appropriate.172 When a gap exists because of
transaction costs, a majoritarian default rule is appropriate.173 However, a penalty
default rule is “appropriate when it is cheaper for the parties to negotiate a term ex
ante than for courts to estimate ex post what the parties would have wanted.” 174
Additionally, courts should be sensitive to the effects created by penalty defaults, 175

Id. at 92-94. But cf. Hadfield, supra note 150, at 547-48, 550 (identifying four reasons for
incompleteness in contracts: transaction costs, strategic deferral, strategic withholdings, and
uncertainty of the law).
166

167

Ayres & Gertner, supra note 157, at 94.

168

Id. at 99-100.

169

Id. at 94, 99.

170

Id. at 92-93; Driesen & Ghosh, supra note 122, at 62, 84.

171

Ayres & Gertner, supra note 157, at 92, 93.

172

Id. at 94.

173

Id. at 93.

Id. at 127-28; see also Duncan v. Theratx, Inc., 775 A.2d 1019, 1021 n.4 (Del. 2001) (“Because
majoritarian rules reduce transactions costs, they are preferred-unless there is a reason to select a
„penalty default‟ rule that forces parties with superior information to disclose some of that
information . . . .”).
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Ayres & Gertner, supra note 157, at 128. Ayres and Gertner warn that if the information being
withheld is private and “acquired with economic resources, the value of information revelation must
also be weighed against the private incentives to acquire it.” Id.
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as well as the possibility that some market correctives may produce inefficiencies in
other markets.176
B. Interpreting Ambiguity and Gaps
As discussed in Part IV, bankruptcy courts are acting strategically by drafting
ambiguous retention orders. A penalty default creates an incentive for bankruptcy
courts to draft more complete orders. Thus, ambiguity should be interpreted in
favor of § 328. However, if ambiguity remains in the fee structure, § 330 should
govern the professional‟s compensation.
1. Contra Proferentem
Ambiguous retention orders should be interpreted against bankruptcy courts.
In both contract disputes and pseudo-contract disputes,177 courts have long used the
interpretive maxim contra proferentem: ambiguities in written contracts will be
construed against the drafter.178 The rule places “the risk of ambiguity, lack of
clarity, and absence of proper warning on the drafting party which could have
forestalled the controversy.”179 It also creates an incentive for contract drafters to
use clear language and saves non-drafting parties from “hidden traps not of their
own making.”180 However, the maxim is only applied when the contract‟s ambiguity
is latent—non-obvious—in character. If the ambiguity is patent—obvious—then
the non-drafter has a duty to seek clarification from the drafting party.181

Thomas S. Ulen, Courts, Legislatures, and the General Theory of Second Best in Law and Economics, 73 CHI.KENT L. REV. 189, 216 (1998). However, the authors point out that it is the legislature, and not the
courts, that should deal with these concerns because courts “competency is limited by the arguments
of the parties before them in light of legal precedent and social custom.”
Id. at 217, 218.
Furthermore, courts would be overstepping their function if they considered such far removed
effects. Id. at 217.
176

United States v. Transfiguracion, 442 F.3d 1222, 1228 (9th Cir. 2006) (using contra proferentem to
interpret a criminal plea agreement against the government).
177

See e.g., Ins. Co. v. Boon, 95 U.S. 117, 128 (1877); JEFFREY FERRIELL & MICHAEL NAVIN,
UNDERSTANDING CONTRACTS 266 (LEXIS 2004).
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179

Sturm v. United States, 421 F.2d 723, 727 (Ct. Cl. 1970).

180

Id.

H & M Moving, Inc. v. United Statesm, 499 F.2d 660, 671 (Ct. Cl. 1974). Compare Id. (construing
ambiguous language that is latent in character in a contract for moving services against the
181
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Contra proferentem is a penalty default rule that induces the drafting party to
relate information to the other parties to the contract.182 In the professional fees
context, contra proferentem would initially interpret ambiguous retention orders in favor
of § 328.183 Thus, it would eliminate the incentive for bankruptcy courts to draft
incomplete orders when they wish to approve a professional‟s employment under §
330.184
For example, in In re Vern D. Blanchard, the retention order stated that
“compensation was „subject to further court approval after due notice and hearing,
and subject to the provisions of Bankruptcy Code sections 328 and 330 . . . .”‟ 185
First, a reviewing court would have to decide whether the order is ambiguous.186
Second, if the court considers the order to be ambiguous, the court would need to
determine whether the ambiguity was patent or latent. This order, if found to be

government) with Chris Berg, Inc. v. United States, 455 F.2d 1037, 1044-45 (Ct. Cl. 1972) (finding that
the ambiguity was “patent and glaring,” and thus, the plaintiff had a duty to seek clarification).
Ayres, supra note 157, at 587. But see Posner, supra note 153, at 578-80 (arguing that the contra
proferentem rule, if classified as a default rule, is majoritarian).
182

This assumes that the professional is arguing that he was employed under § 328. This is a safe
assumption. A professional would not argue that he was employed under § 330 when the bankruptcy
court contends it employed him or her under § 328 because a § 330 reasonableness evaluation could
never guarantee higher compensation than a fee structure approved under § 328.
183

It would do this by directly affecting the sources of judicial utility: reputation and popularity
amongst other judges and members of the legal profession; prestige; and avoiding reversal. See
Richard A. Posner, What Do Judges and Justices Maximize? (The Same Thing Everybody Else Does), 3 SUP.
CT. ECON. REV. 1, 13-15, 31 (1993). Furthermore, bankruptcy judges are not Article III judges; thus,
the “carrot” of possible promotion would have higher utility to bankruptcy judges than the federal
appellate judges focused on by Judge Posner. See id. at 4-7. Moreover, promotion is likely influenced
by the aforementioned sources of utility. Therefore, the sources may have an even higher value for
bankruptcy judges.
184

In re Vern D. Blanchard, No. 96-12037-H7 1, 2 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. Dec. 19, 2005),
www.casb.uscourts.gov/pdf/96_12037m.pdf (citing Order ¶ 3).
185

There is a strong argument that the order unambiguously approves the professional under § 328.
Section 330 is made explicitly “subject to” § 328. 11 U.S.C. § 330(a)(1) (2007). Furthermore, § 328
only covers fees, not expenses. Landry & Higdon, supra note 6, at 555. Reimbursement of expenses
is governed by § 330(a)(1)(b), which provides for “reimbursement for actual, necessary expenses.” 11
U.S.C. § 330(a)(1)(b). Thus, a reasonable interpretation of the order is that § 328 governed the
compensation for services rendered and other compensation, such as the reimbursements of
expenses, was governed by § 330.
186

176
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ambiguous, would be latent because §§ 328 and 330 are not mutually exclusive.187
Third, the court would interpret the order such that § 328 governed the
professional‟s compensation as long as the order specified a specific rate and means
of payment.
2. Filling Gaps
A gap exists when the fee structure is ambiguous after the order is
interpreted against the bankruptcy court. In such a case, § 330 should govern the
professional‟s compensation. In contract disputes, a contract that does not state a
price is, by default, either interpreted to incorporate a reasonable price188 or is not
enforced due to lack of completeness.189 However, in the professional fees context,
neither of these solutions is satisfactory. First, a rule that incorporates a reasonable
price into the order is unhelpful. Both §§ 328 and 330 are designed to award
reasonable compensation.190 Thus, to say that a court should imply a reasonable fee
is tautological. Second, refusing to enforce the retention order eliminates approval
of the professional‟s employment. Such a rule creates the possibility that
professionals either would not be compensated for services already performed or
would be penalized for contesting an ambiguous retention order. Either result
would be unjust.
An incomplete fee structure is more likely the result of transaction costs than
strategic incompleteness. Section 328 is explicitly limited to situations where
particular compensation “terms and conditions” have been pre-approved by the
bankruptcy court.191 Professionals could not reasonably expect § 328 to govern
compensation if a specific rate and means of payment were not approved in the
retention order. Moreover, if either of these were ambiguous, professionals would
be on notice to seek clarification. Therefore, an incomplete fee structure is indicative
of the courts and professionals‟ inability to agree on a fee arrangement because of
187

See supra note 186 and accompanying text.

188

E.g. U.C.C. § 2-305(1)(3) (2007).

U.C.C. § 2-305(3)-(4) (2007). But see Echols v. Pelullo, 377 F.3d 272 (3d Cir. 2004) (refusing to
invalidate a boxing contract that failed to specify the price of each fight because the contract
established the relationship between the parties and price was not a material and essential term).
189

See Landry & Higdon, supra note 6, at 567 (“To obtain the benefit of section 328 . . . requires prior
approval of the fee contract, which in turn usually requires some type of reasonableness test.”).
190

191

See 11 U.S.C. § 328(a) (2007).
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the transaction costs associated with pre-approval. Furthermore, Congress intended
§ 330 to govern professionals‟ fees unless there was prior agreement to a fee
arrangement, prescribing § 330 as the untailored majoritarian default rule. Thus,
because an ambiguous fee arrangement is likely the result of transaction costs,
Congress‟ majoritarian default rule, § 330, should be used to fill the gap.
For example, in In re Texas Securities, Inc., the bankruptcy court‟s modifying
order established a combination of contingent fee and hourly fee compensation but
did not set a specific rate of payment.192 Furthermore, the modifying order stated
that “it „[did] not modify, in any respect, [the court‟s] authority to review this and all
employment orders in accordance with Section 328 of the Bankruptcy Code.”‟193 A
reviewing court might find the later language ambiguous and use contra proferentem to
make an initial finding that § 328 governs the professional‟s compensation.
However, because the order only states the means of determining payment and not
the rate, § 330 would ultimately govern the order.
C. Summary
Reviewing courts should use contract law principles to interpret ambiguous
retention orders. Courts should apply contra proferentem to read ambiguous orders in
favor of § 328. However, if a gap remains, § 330 should be the default rule. This
proposal will increase clarity in professional compensation through more complete
retention orders. Although bankruptcy courts considering a professional‟s retention
application will have to decide between the advantages of § 328 and the advantages
of § 330, statutory reform is the proper solution to any problems associated with this
decision. Hopefully, the proposed interpretive strategy will highlight these problems
for Congress by restoring the distinction between §§ 328 and 330 that Congress
desired when it reformed the Bankruptcy Code.
VI. CONCLUSION
Numerous critics have decried the “staggering” height of professional fees in
bankruptcy proceedings.194 “For better or worse, professional compensation is the
„lightening rod‟ of the bankruptcy system, attracting adverse publicity for a system
that already suffers from misunderstanding at the hands of the public and the
192

Peele v. Cunningham (In re Tex. Sec., Inc.), 218 F.3d 443, 444-45 (5th Cir. 2000).

193

Id. at 445.
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E.g., Baker, supra note 13, at 35.
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press.”195 However, the solution is statutory reform, not ambiguous retention orders
and conflicting interpretative standards.
While Congress‟ desire for a competitive compensation scheme will attract
qualified professionals to the bankruptcy arena, the courts‟ arbitrary and uncertain
interpretation will deeply undermine this effect. Professionals need to feel secure in
the status of their compensation, even if this security is only the knowledge that their
fee is subject to a “reasonableness” review. Ambiguous retention orders are, at best,
disconcerting, and at worst, dishonest. Furthermore, they only soften the problems
associated with choosing between ex ante and ex post compensation while producing
additional and more costly effects. Reviewing courts must create an incentive for
clarity. Using contract law principles to interpret ambiguous retention orders will
achieve this result. Otherwise, qualified professionals will once again start an exodus
toward more lucrative fields. This would be a tragedy not only for Congress but also
for debtors and creditors—the very parties the bankruptcy system is meant to assist.
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Clark, supra note 19, at 235.

